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Abstract 
Many large government programs provide benefits in kind as opposed to in cash. Providing 
benefits in kind potentially distorts decisions and leads to a deadweight loss if recipients value 
the benefits less than a cost-equivalent cash transfer. Yet providing benefits in kind may have 
some offsetting benefits, especially in terms of improving the targeting of benefits to desired 
beneficiaries. We complete what is to our knowledge one of the first empirical studies of the 
costs and benefits of providing transfers in kind as opposed to in cash. We focus on the case of 
the US Medicaid program's provision of in kind home health care benefits. Three state Medicaid 
programs completed randomized experiments that converted the usual in-kind benefits into cash 
benefits for a randomly-selected subset of benefit recipients. We use the results of these 
experiments together with a variety of other evidence to estimate the costs and benefits of 
providing Medicaid home care benefits in kind. We find that in the case of Medicaid home care 
benefits, both the costs and benefits of providing transfers in kind as opposed to in cash are large. 
This suggests that alternative targeting mechanisms, if available, have the potential to 
significantly increase efficiency relative to traditional Medicaid policy. 
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1 Introduction 
Economists have long considered the question of whether transfers should be provided in 
cash or in-kind. A fundamental principle of economic theory suggests that consumers will, 
in general, at least weakly prefer receiving transfers in cash to cost-equivalent in-kind 
transfers. Cash transfers afford recipients greater flexibility in tailoring their consumption 
to their tastes and circumstances. This is a major advantage of cash over in-kind transfers. 
Yet providing transfers in-kind potentially has offsetting benefits, such as improving the 
targeting of benefits to intended recipients, reducing moral hazard in the context of the 
Samaritan’s Dilemma, and increasing the efficiency of the tax system. Thus, it is an 
empirical question whether a particular transfer is more efficiently provided in kind or in 
cash. 
The question of the mode of the transfer is not purely academic. In-kind transfers are 
ubiquitous in government programs, charities, and private insurance. Currie and Gahvari 
(2008) report that early in the 21st century, the United States government spent more than 
12 percent of GDP on just three in-kind programs combined (health, child care, and 
education). 
Much of the empirical literature to date has focused on the costs of in-kind transfer 
programs (the consumption distortion), and much of this literature has focused on food 
stamp programs (e.g., Moffitt, 1989; Whitmore Schanzenbach, 2002). Much of the 
theoretical literature, by contrast, has considered possible benefits of in-kind transfers, such 
as improved targeting of benefits to desired beneficiaries (Nichols and Zeckhauser, 1982; 
Blackorby and Donaldson, 1988), improved tax system efficiency (Munro, 1992), and the 
Samaritan’s dilemma (Bruce and Waldman, 1991). Such benefits imply that providing 
benefits in kind can in some cases be optimal, despite the resulting consumption distortion. 
Prominent among the potential benefits of providing in-kind benefits is improved targeting 
efficiency. Governments and private insurance pools face a major difficulty: Information 
problems limit their ability to finely condition the benefits they deliver on the state of the 
world, i.e., to effectively target benefits to intended beneficiaries and not others. In practice 
they have to make transfers contingent on coarse bundles of states rather than particular 
states, and the coarse bundles may include component states with widely varying levels of 
optimal transfers. Well-chosen in-kind benefits can potentially alleviate this problem. 
Because there is heterogeneity in the values that people place on a particular good, a 
planner could strategically choose the bundle of goods that is provided in-kind to attract 
only a subset of the population to participate in the program (targeting on the extensive 
margin) or lead to differential intensity of program participation among participants 
2
 
(targeting on the intensive margin). Providing transfers in cash does not automatically 
allow for the same targeting benefits: a dollar is worth a dollar to everyone. Providing 
transfers in cash makes the program equally attractive to both targets and non-targets. 
In this paper, we undertake a theory-guided investigation of the costs and benefits of 
providing transfers in-kind. Our empirical application is in health care, a large and 
rapidly-growing part of government budgets in many countries. In particular, we focus on 
the provision of home health care benefits by the US Medicaid program. Medicaid provides 
certain individuals assistance with tasks to enable them to live at home instead of a 
nursing home. For example, some beneficiaries can obtain help with bathing, housekeeping, 
eating, and other personal care tasks. Medicaid contracts with approved agencies to 
provide this “formal care” to recipients. However, Medicaid participants supplement their 
“formal care” with “informal care” provided by family and friends. Home health care is a 
particularly good setting to assess the costs and benefits of in-kind provision for a number 
of reasons. First, informal care is used widely and can be a close substitute for formal care 
in many situations. That implies the consumption distortion due to in-kind provision could 
be very large. On the other hand, there is considerable unobservable heterogeneity in the 
costs of informal care across individuals. That implies that in-kind provision could lead to 
significant targeting benefits. To quantify the trade-offs facing both social and private 
insurance, we (i) measure the consumption distortion from the in-kind provision of 
Medicaid home care benefits using randomized experiments; (ii) provide a variety of 
evidence on the targeting benefits of the in-kind provision of Medicaid home care benefits; 
and (iii) discuss the implications for Medicaid and other programs. 
To estimate the consumption distortion due to in-kind provision of transfers, we use data 
from experiments that the Arkansas, Florida, and New Jersey Medicaid programs 
implemented. In these experiments, participants were randomized to receive traditional 
Medicaid benefits (control group) or the value of the benefits in cash (treatment group). 
Those who were assigned to the treatment group received the cash transfer, but were only 
allowed to use the money for home health care. Although the cash was restricted in its use, 
it allowed Medicaid recipients to not only use regular formal care, but to pay their informal 
care providers. Thus, being randomized to treatment greatly expanded the set of home 
health care goods the recipient could purchase. We find that on average, members of the 
treatment group reduced their use of formal care by more than 50 percent. This suggests 
that Medicaid recipients’ home health care use is severely distorted by the in-kind 
provision of the transfer. We then estimate the deadweight loss due to this consumption 
distortion.1 We find that the deadweight loss due to in-kind provision ranges from $526 to 
1As discussed in much more detail in the paper, the experiments do not directly estimate the demand 
curve necessary to calculate the deadweight loss due to the consumption distortion. To adjust the demand 
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$2,505 per Medicaid home care user per year. Extrapolating those figures to the entire 
Medicaid home health care population, the aggregate deadweight loss due to the 
consumption distortion ranges from $1.5 billion to $7.1 billion per year. 
Given our finding of a significant consumption distortion cost, it is important to evaluate 
the potential benefits of providing home care in-kind. Currie and Gahvari (2008) review 
the large body of theory on targeting and conclude that providing transfers in-kind does 
not dramatically increase targeting efficiency because there is often a means test or other 
barrier to participation in the program. Despite this assessment, we estimate the extent to 
which providing the current bundle of benefits in-kind helps Medicaid target its “desired 
beneficiaries,” defined in various ways. We find that paying benefits in kind offers a 
significant advantage in terms of targeting efficiency compared to paying cash benefits. In 
other words, Medicaid’s particular bundle of in-kind transfers helps target benefits toward 
desired beneficiaries. Our estimates suggest that the targeting benefits due to the in-kind 
provision of Medicaid home care are approximately $1.7 billion. 
We do not find strong evidence that providing benefits in-kind increased tax system 
efficiency or reduced moral hazard in the context of the Samaritan’s Dilemma. Taken 
together, our results suggest that the benefits of in-kind provision are near the bottom end 
of our estimated range for the cost of the consumption distortion. 
2	 Medicaid personal care services and the Cash and 
Counseling experiments 
Medicaid provides home and community-based services (HCBS) primarily through two 
programs: the Medicaid Title XIX PCS optional State plan and the Medicaid 1915(c) 
HCBS waiver program.2 Typical care services include help with housekeeping, bathing, 
dressing, and eating. Medicaid HCBS have grown rapidly in recent years. In 1999, 1.9 
million people received care through the HCBS programs; by 2007, that number had 
expanded to 2.8 million. In addition to the growing number of participants, the fraction of 
Medicaid long-term care dollars that go to HCBS has risen from 19 percent in 1995 to 42 
percent in 2008 (Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, 2011). Because of 
rising use and the economic downturn Medicaid HCBS budgets have been under 
curve that comes out of the experiments, we use variation in minimum wage laws that shifts the costs of 
home health care in the general population. This instrumental variables strategy recovers an estimate of 
the elasticity of demand for formal care that, when combined with the experimental results, allows us to 
estimate the deadweight loss due to the consumption distortion. 
2More detailed summaries of Medicaid-provided personal care services are available in LeBlanc et al. 
(2001) and Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured (2011). 
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tremendous pressure to keep costs down. This has led to a number of demonstration 
projects that tested different approaches to reducing the costs of providing these services. 
We use data from experiments run in Arkansas, Florida, and New Jersey. They are 
collectively known as the Cash and Counseling experiments (C&C). 
Although the three states differed in their exact implementations, each experiment had a 
few basic features. After completing a baseline survey, consumers were randomized to 
either receive services as usual (control group) or to direct their own personal care 
(treatment group). Treatment group members were given a monthly stipend with which 
they could hire workers or purchase other services or goods for their personal care needs 
(e.g., assistive devices, home modifications). However, treated members had to keep 
receipts for their purchases to show that they were spending the money on personal care 
services.3 Thus, treatment group members did not simply receive a straight cash transfer. 
Instead, they received a cash benefit that could be spent on a specific class of goods. 
Personal care services can be classified as either formal or informal care. Formal care is 
provided by home health or personal care agencies while informal care is usually provided 
by family and friends. Medicaid programs traditionally provide formal care (in-kind 
benefit). To receive formal care, a Medicaid recipient creates a care plan with a physician 
or registered nurse and then has that plan approved by a designated agency (e.g., the 
Arkansas Foundation for Medical Care in Arkansas). Conditional on approval, the 
physician or registered nurse and the consumer choose a provider from a list of 
Medicaid-qualified agencies. In the experiments, treatment group members were not 
restricted to hire care providers from the list of approved agencies. This greatly expanded 
their choice set for personal care. 
In Arkansas and New Jersey, the cash allowance given to treatment group members was 
not simply the full value of the care in their care plans. In these states, Medicaid recipients 
had previously used only a fraction of the care outlined in their care plans.4 Thus cashing 
out the full value of the care plan would have compensated the treatment group members 
by more than the value of the care they could have expected to receive under the regular 
Medicaid program. In Florida, analysis showed that Medicaid recipients were receiving, on 
average, all the services described in their care plans. Consequently, there was not an 
adjustment in the number of hours that were cashed out for treatment group members. 
However, all three states cashed out care plans at less than their full value to pay the 
3Treated consumers could spend up to 10 percent of their allowance on services that could not be readily 
invoiced (e.g., a neighbor mows the lawn). 
4They do not receive the full extent of the plan for a number of reasons, the most frequent being institu­




counselors who helped treatment group members construct their plans.5 To the extent that 
treatment group members were not fully compensated for the value of care they could 
receive under traditional Medicaid (all treatment group members had the option of leaving 
the experiment at any time and resuming their normal Medicaid care), substitution 
between formal and informal care will be understated. 
Although consumers were randomized to the treatment and control groups (50 percent 
chance of being treated), not every participant completed the nine-month followup survey. 
Averaged across the three states, 20 and 35 percent of the treatment and control groups, 
respectively, attrited. If attrition is correlated with being in the treatment group and with 
care use, then the exogeneity of treatment could be compromised. However, as seen in the 
top panel of Table 1, there does not appear to be any differential attrition across the two 
groups. Baseline use of care, health, gender, age, race, and education are all very similar 
across the sample of treated and control group consumers. Of the 30 balance tests shown 
in the top panel, none of the differences between treatment and control groups are 
statistically distinguishable from zero at the 5 percent level. 
The bottom panel of Table 1 reports the hours of formal and informal care the consumers 
received in the two weeks preceding the nine-month followup survey. This comparison 
reveals that on average, treatment group members consumed about 8 fewer hours of formal 
care per week in Arkansas, 23 fewer hours in New Jersey, and 18 fewer hours in Florida. 
These differences suggest that in-kind provision of home care may cause a substantial 
consumption distortion. 
3	 The cost of in-kind benefits: consumption 
distortion 
The main cost of providing benefits in kind is a deadweight loss from distorting 
consumption; receiving benefits in kind may lead some people to consume more of that 
good than they otherwise would have had they received a cash benefit. Other things equal, 
recipients would be better off receiving a cost-equivalent cash transfer instead. Figure 1 
shows this graphically. The figure depicts an in-kind benefit program that provides up to 
two units of formal care to eligible recipients. This shifts the budget line two units outward 
in the direction of greater formal care. Unlike a cost-equivalent cash transfer, however, the 
in-kind transfer does not increase the maximum amount of other goods (other than formal 
care) that recipients can consume at low levels of formal care. For recipients who would 
5The experimental demonstrations had budget neutrality requirements that necessitated such a step. 
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have chosen to consume at least two units of formal care had they received a 
cost-equivalent cash transfer, the in-kind transfer is equivalent to a cash transfer and there 
is no consumption distortion cost. For recipients who would consume less than two units of 
formal care if they received a cost-equivalent cash transfer, the in-kind transfer is less 
valuable than a cost-equivalent cash transfer. The difference between the cost of the 
transfer and the smaller value they place on it is a deadweight loss from providing the 
transfer in kind as opposed to in cash. In the figure, this loss is the distance between the 
hypothetical cash-transfer budget line (dashed black line running from (0,7) to (7,0)) and a 
parallel budget line that would allow the individual to achieve the utility level she achieves 
under the in-kind transfer program. In the case of the individual with blue indifference 
curves, this cost is slightly less than the cost of one unit of all other goods (or, equivalently, 
slightly less than the cost of one unit of formal care). 
When trying to estimate the magnitude of the consumption distortion caused by the 
in-kind provision of transfers, researchers have generally focused on food stamp, or direct 
food transfer, programs (Cunha, 2013; Hidrobo et al., 2012; Hoynes and Whitmore 
Schanzenbach, 2009; Moffitt, 1989; Whitmore Schanzenbach, 2002). Moffitt (1989) first 
estimated the marginal value of food stamps using a 1982 policy change in Puerto Rico 
which converted food stamps into direct cash payments. He found that there was very little 
distortion induced by in-kind provision. The majority of consumers were inframarginal, 
i.e., the transfers were small enough that most people purchased food with cash (in 
addition to that purchased with the stamps) and so faced the full price for their marginal 
purchases. He then argues that for the minority of consumers whose consumption was 
distorted, a trafficking market made the food stamps worth very close to their face value in 
cash. Whitmore Schanzenbach (2002) finds similar results to Moffitt (1989) using 
experiments in San Diego’s and Alabama’s food stamp programs. The experiments 
randomized participants to receive food stamps or the cash value of the stamps. Although 
the majority of consumers were inframarginal, those who were not valued food stamps at 
approximately eighty cents on the dollar. 
Instead of focusing directly on the marginal value of the good provided in-kind, we are 
primarily interested in estimating the welfare loss due to the consumption distortion.6 To 
measure this welfare loss, we need to estimate the demand curve for formal care. With that 
demand curve, we can then calculate the deadweight loss triangle associated with any 
overconsumption of formal care. The Cash and Counseling Experiments effectively 
generate a large, discrete jump in the price of formal care. Under traditional Medicaid, the 
6There is also a related literature on whether cash transfers should be restricted or unrestricted (Baird 
et al., 2011). The C&C program only varies whether the transfer was provided in-kind, not whether there 
were restrictions on the transfer. 
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dollar price of formal home care is zero – Medicaid provides the care in-kind. Although the 
dollar price is zero, the shadow price of Medicaid care that incorporates the difficulty of 
scheduling with providers and other such costs is certainly positive. We focus our discussion 
on the dollar price for care, but recognize it is just an approximation to the full price the 
consumer faces. For consumers in the treatment group, the marginal dollar price for formal 
home care jumps up to the market price. Based on the Gemworth Financial surveys of 
home care agencies, the average price for an hour of home care in Arkansas, New Jersey, 
and Florida was $12.72 ($10.90 in Arkansas, $12.65 in Florida, and $14.60 in New Jersey).7 
Table 2 reports the average hours of formal care along with the estimated percentage 
impact of treatment. The first column pools all three states and finds that treatment 
reduced the number of formal care hours by just over 50 percent. The next three columns 
present the same results separately for each state. In each state, treatment group members 
used considerably less formal care than control group members. The estimates suggest that 
on average, raising the dollar price of formal care by $1 will reduce the use of formal care 
by 3.4 percent in Arkansas, 4.1 percent in Florida, and 3.4 percent in New Jersey. On 
average, a $1 increase in the price of formal care reduces the quantity used by 3.6 percent. 
Although the experiment’s randomization provides an exogenous source of variation, it 
does not directly recover the demand curve necessary to estimate the deadweight loss due 
to the consumption distortion. Instead, it provides an upper bound on this deadweight 
loss. Figure 2 shows a Medicaid home care user’s demand curve for formal care. When 
Medicaid provides care in-kind, consumers pay nothing out-of-pocket for it and so value 
that care somewhere between $0 and the market price at that quantity. Thus, consumers 
are initially at a point like A. However, those treated in the C&C experiment face the 
market price for care and locate at the equilibrium point B. The experimental evidence 
essentially connects points A and B to estimate the demand curve. Unfortunately, this 
overstates the demand curve’s steepness which affects the deadweight loss calculation. The 
true deadweight loss is given by C, the area between the true demand and supply curves 
past the market equilibrium. An estimate of deadweight loss based on the C&C demand 
curve counts not only C, but D as well. 
To solve this problem, we estimate the elasticity of demand for home care in the 
population more generally and use that estimate to recover the price that C&C 
participants would have been willing to pay for the quantity of formal care they received 
under Medicaid. As seen in Figure 2, with this price p1, we can estimate the actual 
7The prices reported in the survey were from 2005. Because the experiments happened around 2000, we 
adjust the prices not only by the CPI, but also for price growth in the home care sector. For Arkansas, 
we observe the price that Medicaid paid for care in 2000 and use that price, combined with the Gemworth 
Financial survey data to make the adjustment. 
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deadweight loss due to the consumption distortion, not just an upper bound on that 
deadweight loss. Let εpop be the elasticity of demand for the population. And let 
εcc(dln(q), p2, p1) be the elasticity for people in the C&C experiments as a function of the 
percentage change in quantity, and the old (p1) and new (p2) price for care. If those two 
elasticities are equal, εpop = εcc(dln(q), p2, p1), and we know εpop, dln(q), and p2, then we 
can recover p1. 8 Note that both p2 and dln(q) are available from our previous analysis of 
the C&C data ($12.72 and -53 respectively). The final piece needed is the elasticity of 
demand for home care. We now turn to estimating it. 
We use changes in states’ minimum wage laws to estimate the demand curve for formal 
care in the population more broadly. In particular, changes in minimum wage laws shift 
the costs of providing formal home care and identify points along the demand curve. The 
underlying identifying assumption is that minimum wage laws shift the supply curve around 
without directly affecting the demand curve, i.e. that the only reason minimum wage laws 
impact the quantity demanded is through their impact on the price of formal care. 
First, we test whether the minimum wage laws affected how much home health care 
workers are paid. Using data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics for the fifty states and 
Washington D.C., we estimate the following equation. 
wagesst = min wage amountstβ + XstΓ + λs + λy + εst (1) 
where wages is the average hourly wage for home health care workers in each state and 
year, min wage amount is the relevant minimum wage in the state and year, X are 
demographic including variables for age, gender, and race, λs are state fixed effects, λy are 
year fixed effects, and ε is the error term.9 Regressions are weighted by state population 
and standard errors are clustered at the state level. 
Table 3 reports the results from equation (1). In the first column, demographic 
characteristics are omitted. The result indicates that increasing the minimum wage by one 
dollar will increase home care workers’ wages by approximately 41 cents. The coefficient is 
highly significant and implies a first-stage F-statistic of more than 30. The next column 
includes the demographic variables mentioned above. The coefficient decreases slightly in 
magnitude, though it remains highly statistically significant. In the final column of the 
table, leads of the minimum wage have been included in the regression. Neither is large in 
magnitude nor anywhere approaching statistical significance. This suggests that the 
8More specifically, with values for εpop, dln(q), and p2, the following equation can be solved to recover p1: 
(p2 − p1)/((p2 + p1)/2) − dln(q)/εpop = 0. 
9The age, gender, and race variables indicate the fraction of the population of a given age, gender, and 
race. We use two age categories, below or above 60, two gender categories, and three race categories, white, 
black, and other. 
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minimum wage laws are affecting the wage levels and not simply picking up underlying 
trends. 
The second stage of this analysis is to test whether minimum wage laws affect the number 
of people employed as home health care aides. There is a long literature that estimates the 
impact of minimum wage laws on employment more generally. Recently, Meer and West 
(2012) have studied the dynamic effects of minimum wages on employment and found that 
an increase in the minimum wage does not lead to job destruction, but a slowdown in the 
growth rate of new jobs. This suggests that changes in the minimum wage will not have 
immediate effects, but will affect employment over time. Because of this finding, we 
estimate the impact of lagged minimum wage laws on the current stock of home care 
employees. Our specification is 
home care employeesst 
= min wage amounts,t−1α + XstΓ2 + λs + λy + νst (2)
1k population 60+st 
where the dependent variable is the number of home care employees per 1,000 people 60 or 
older and the right hand side variables are the same as those described in equation (1) with 
the exception of the lagged minimum wage. Ideally, we would have a measure of hours of 
formal care consumed, but, to the extent of our knowledge, those data do not exist. 
Instead, the number of home care employees proxies for the equilibrium quantity of care 
consumed.10 The counts of home care employees come from the County Business Patterns 
data.11 Because the number of employees is a stock, there is likely autocorrelation in the 
error terms, νst. As such, we assume an AR(1) process and estimate equation (2). 
Table 4 presents the results. The baseline specification without demographics implies that 
a $1 increase in the minimum wage last year reduces the number of home health care aides 
per 1,000 people 60 or older by approximately .8. Relative to the mean, 12.8, this implies a 
reduction of just over 6 percent. When demographic controls are included, this estimate 
rises to 1.08 in magnitude. 
To test whether the changes in minimum wage laws are are simply picking up underlying 
trends, we include two leads of the minimum wage in equation (2). These results are 
reported in the final column of Table 4. None of the leads are systematically related to the 
dependent variable at conventional significance levels. This suggests that we are not simply 
picking up trends in employment and lends credence to the identifying assumption. Using 
the identifying assumption, we can divide the impacts reported in Table 4 by those reported 
in Table 3 to recover the elasticity of demand. Our estimates imply an elasticity of -2.1. 
10Our dependent variable is expressed as a rate so that its units are similar to those in the C&C analysis. 
11We used SIC code 8080 and NAICS code 621610 in the appropriate years. 
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With an estimate for the elasticity of demand in the broader population, we now have all 
of the pieces needed to solve for p1, consumers’ willingness to pay for the quantity of formal 
care received from Medicaid. We find that consumers would have been willing to pay $9.89 
per unit of formal care at the quantity of care provided by Medicaid. The following 
deadweight loss estimates are subject to a number of caveats: we use different populations 
to estimate the elasticities that we assume are equal, formal care provided by Medicaid 
might not be exactly the same good as formal care purchased in the general market, and 
we use evidence from relatively small changes in the minimum wage and use them to 
extrapolate to large changes. Subject to these caveats, we estimate the deadweight loss 
triangle, C in Figure 2, with the formula, (p2 − p1)Δq/2. Our estimates imply that per 
person-year, the deadweight loss is approximately $526. To the extent that the supply of 
formal care is not perfectly elastically supplied and to the extent that the demand for 
formal care is more elastic in the general population than the Medicaid population, our 
deadweight loss calculation represents a lower bound on the true value.12 We can also 
estimate an upper bound on the deadweight loss, by assuming that participants valued the 
marginal unit of Medicaid-provided formal care at $0. We estimate an upper bound on the 
loss of approximately $2,505 per Medicaid home care user per year. 
The Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured (2011) estimates that 2.82 million 
people received home care services from Medicaid in 2007. Extrapolating our deadweight 
loss estimates to this population implies that the consumption distortion due to the in-kind 
provision of goods is between 1.5 and 7.1 billion dollars per year (in year 2000 dollars). 
4	 The Benefits of In-Kind Transfers: Targeting 
Benefits 
Providing transfers in kind can improve targeting efficiency by leading to systematic 
self-selection into program participation by the people who have the most to gain from the 
program. When the planner wishes to redistribute resources across types that she cannot 
verifiably distinguish from each other, she can potentially use in-kind benefits to induce a 
favorable self-selection into program participation if different types place different values on 
the good(s) in the in-kind benefits bundle. 
12First, if the supply curve is not in fact perfectly elastic, then the change in price used in the DWL cal­
culation understates the base of the triangle. And second, the demand elasticity estimated from the broader 
population might be greater than the elasticity of demand for Medicaid participants because Medicaid home 
care users are likely to be sicker than the general population. If true, our estimated willingness to pay of 
$9.89 will be greater than the actual willingness to pay. 
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Planner’s problem.— Suppose the population is comprised of individuals who 
potentially differ in terms of their required care, η, their informal care costs, σ, and their 
labor productivity, α. In the absence of government intervention, consumption is increasing 
in labor productivity and is decreasing in required care and in care costs. If private 
arrangements fail to break the link between individual characteristics and consumption,13 a 
utilitarian (or other type of) planner may wish to intervene to redistribute resources from 
individuals with higher labor productivity and lower care costs to individuals with lower 
labor productivity and higher care costs.14 
First best: full insurance.— If the planner can verifiably distinguish between different 
types, then she can achieve the first-best, which involves full insurance. Government 
transfers exactly offset the disadvantages of having low labor productivity or high care 
requirements or costs and every type consumes the same amount. 
Second best: incomplete information.— If on the other hand the planner cannot verifiably 
distinguish between different types, then she will in most cases be unable to provide full 
insurance. How completely the planner is able to insure “type risk” and which tools will 
prove useful to her in doing so depends on the particular information structure she faces. 
Suppose, in the interest of approximating the apparent constraints on many social 
insurance programs such as the Medicaid program in the US, that the planner is either 
unwilling or unable to condition transfers on labor productivity, informal care costs, 
informal care use, and consumption. Instead, the planner is willing and able to condition 
transfers only on care needs, savings, and formal care use. In this case, the key constraint 
facing the planner is the inability to condition transfers on labor productivity and informal 
care costs. This constraint limits the extent to which the planner will be able to provide 
insurance. This constraint also, as noted by Nichols and Zeckhauser (1982) and others, 
expands the set of “tools” the planner might wish to use in trying to provide insurance, 
from traditional cash transfers that impose no constraints on recipients to various types of 
transfers that come with strings attached, such as means tests and in-kind transfers. The 
cost of imposing restrictions on recipients is that this makes participation in the program 
less valuable to them. The benefit is that, whereas the planner cannot transfer different 
amounts of cash to different types that she cannot verifiably distinguish (since everyone 
13Two reasons private arrangements may fail to fully insure these risks are (i) some of these risks might 
be realized before people can enter into risk-sharing contracts, e.g., labor productivity may be largely fixed 
before people enter adulthood, and (ii) some of these characteristics might be unverifiable, i.e., it may not be 
possible to write contracts that condition on the values of certain characteristics perhaps due to information 
problems or legal restrictions. 
14Depending on the nature of the process by which people come to have these characteristics, the planner’s 
intervention could be considered social insurance (if one’s characteristics are realized as the result of a risky 
process, including perhaps one’s endowment at birth) or redistribution. 
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values cash and can simply report that they are of the type due the largest cash benefit), 
the planner can potentially make different transfers to types she cannot distinguish by 
imposing well-chosen conditions on transfer recipients that are least costly to those types 
she wishes to target. 
Figure 3 shows a simple example of how this can work in practice. Providing benefits in 
kind, if combined with imposing some other restriction on beneficiaries behavior, can lead 
certain types to self-select into the program at higher rates than others. In the figure, the 
additional “restriction” (in addition to providing formal care in kind when resale is 
impossible) is simply modeled as a fixed “buy in” to participate in the program, paid in 
one unit of “all other goods”. Paying this cost entitles recipients to two units of formal 
care, free of other charges. This “buy in” cost can be thought of as a stand in for the 
utility cost of any restrictions that the program might impose on beneficiaries. State 
Medicaid programs, for example, limit eligibility to people with low levels of income and 
assets. These can be thought of as restrictions on the choices that would-be recipients can 
make if they want to participate in the program. 
In the figure, individuals who would purchase at least two units of formal care even in the 
absence of the program (like those represented by the green indifference curves) are strictly 
better off participating in the program and thereby having their purchases of formal care 
effectively subsidized. Individuals who would purchase little if any formal care in the 
absence of the program (like those represented by the blue indifference curves) may be 
better off not participating in the program. Although they may place some value on the 
in-kind formal care benefits provided by the program, it may not be sufficiently large to 
justify paying the other costs of participating in the program, whether a financial “buy in” 
or a binding restriction on behavior such as labor supply and earned income. Clearly, 
pure-cash programs, i.e., programs in which both the costs of participating and the benefits 
bundle are comprised exclusively of cash, cannot induce such a systematic self-selection 
into program participation. In-kind programs, by contrast, in which either the costs of 
participating or the benefits bundle are comprised at least partly of goods, can potentially 
lead to a systematic self-selection into program participation. The type of goods that have 
the biggest potential to induce differential selection into program participation of different 
groups are those for which the demand is much greater among some groups than others 
and of which resale is costly. 
In the following sections we try a variety of approaches to estimate the targeting properties 
of the bundle of in-kind home-care benefits currently provided by many state Medicaid 
programs. The goal is to measure the extent to which benefits are received by various 
groups that a planner might wish to target to greater or lesser extents, and to compare this 
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allocation to that which might be expected to arise under a means-tested cash benefit 
program. This comparison should reveal how providing benefits in kind affects the 
distribution of benefits received by different groups. 
The analysis proceeds in two parts. In the first, we measure the targeting effects of 
providing benefits in-kind on the extensive margin (i.e., whether someone participates in 
Medicaid) using the Health and Retirement Study. In the second part, we measure the 
targeting effects of providing benefits in-kind on the intensive margin (i.e., benefits received 
among Medicaid participants) using data from Cash and Counseling experiment. 
For a variety of possible reasons, the planner might place a higher value on a given 
increment to wealth among some people (“targets”) than among others. Paying benefits in 
kind as opposed to in cash potentially helps the planner make larger net transfers to the 
(unverifiable) types she wishes to target. This improvement in targeting efficiency can be 
achieved if offering the particular bundle of in-kind benefits leads those types that the 
planner wishes to target to self-select into the program at higher rates than non-targets or 
to participate more intensively in the program than non-targets. The targeting benefit of 
paying transfers in kind is positively related to the extent to which paying transfers in kind 
shifts resources from non-targets to targets. 
Measuring the improvement, if any, in targeting efficiency from paying transfers in kind as 
opposed to in cash faces two main challenges. First, it requires knowledge of the 
distribution of benefits under both the in-kind and the counterfactual in-cash benefits 
programs. For simplicity, in our main comparisons we assume that take up of pure cash 
benefits would be 100%. This is a natural benchmark, as a pure cash program does not 
involve any cost of claiming benefits, whether in terms of hassles, stigma, or other sources. 
Moreover, it is straightforward to adjust the results to situations in which take up of the 
(impure) counterfactual cash benefit program is less than perfect.15 
The second and greater challenge in measuring the targeting benefits of in-kind benefits is 
translating any given difference in the distribution of net benefits between the in-kind 
program and the counterfactual cash program into a single-value measure of the change in 
targeting efficiency. Fully accomplishing this requires specifying a social welfare function 
and the underlying utility functions of each individual. At the other extreme, one could 
simply characterize the distributions of net benefits under both types of programs and not 
attempt to translate the change in the distribution into any single-valued change in social 
welfare. We take a middle road. The main thrust of our analysis is characterizing the 
distributions of net benefits under both types of programs. Then, given these distributions, 
15See Currie and Gahvari (2008) for a review of take up of many programs. Ganong and Liebman (2013) 
document take up of the US food stamps program and find that it has fluctuated significantly over time. 
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we make rough calculations of the effects on social welfare for a variety of social welfare 
functions. 
The key task of the empirical work is therefore to measure the extent of redistribution 
toward various groups who differ in the extent to which they are targeted, which depends 
on the planner’s objective function. In selecting groups across which to measure the extent 
of redistribution, we focus on characteristics that affect the feasible rate of consumption. In 
the simplest model in which everyone shares the same preferences, this approach is 
consistent with the approach of a utilitarian planner, who wishes to transfer resources from 
people with high rates of consumption (and so low marginal utilities of income) to people 
with low rates of consumption (and so high marginal utilities of income).16 In what follows, 
we measure redistribution across groups of people who differ in their consumption 
opportunities due to underlying differences in permanent income, health, and informal care 
costs. 
4.1	 Targeting on the extensive margin: Evidence from the 
Health and Retirement Study 
The Health and Retirement Study (HRS) is a representative panel of Americans age 51 and 
over. The HRS has surveyed participants on a variety of information about themselves 
roughly every two years, with the longest-tracked cohort first interviewed in 1992. It 
contains especially rich information about respondents’ health and wealth. The key 
variables for our analysis are: an indicator variable for whether the individual was covered 
by Medicaid;17 variables that determine an individual’s eligibility for Medicaid benefits, 
including income and wealth; and variables that are associated with plausible definitions of 
“targetedness”, such as proxies for permanent income (e.g., years of schooling, total income 
during retirement, or Social Security income) and proxies for informal care costs (e.g., 
whether the individual has a spouse, the health status of the individual’s spouse, and how 
many children the individual has). 
Table 5 presents Medicaid participation rates among several different groups, where 
16The assumption that everyone has the same preferences, although standard in much of the optimal 
policy literature, is potentially problematic in the context of health problems, since health might affect the 
mapping between consumption and utility. See, e.g., Viscusi and Evans (1990) and Finkelstein et al. (2013) 
on health-dependent utility. 
17Respondents are asked whether they are covered by Medicaid. We interpret this to mean that the 
respondent has received at least some medical care that was paid for at least partially by Medicaid over 
the period since the last interview. Unfortunately, details about the exact nature of the services covered by 
Medicaid or their dollar value are not available. Fortunately, such information is available in the C&C data, 
which we analyze next. 
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individuals are assigned to groups on the basis of the values of characteristics related to 
their “targetedness,” i.e., the likely value that a utilitarian planner would place on 
marginal changes in their wealth. The figure reveals that more targeted individuals—those 
with lower permanent income, in worse health, or with higher informal care costs—are 
more likely to participate in Medicaid. This holds both in the full population and in the 
subpopulation of people whose income and wealth likely makes them eligible for Medicaid. 
Similarly, OLS and probit regressions (not reported) of Medicaid participation on various 
measures of targetedness and demographic variables indicate that, holding other 
characteristics fixed, increasing an individual’s targetedness on one dimension (e.g., 
reducing permanent income) is associated with greater Medicaid participation. In both the 
bivariate and multivariate analyses, the association between Medicaid participation and 
measures of targetedness tend to be strongest for the proxies for permanent income and 
health status and are somewhat weaker for the proxies for informal care costs. 
Overall, the results suggest that Medicaid redistributes resources toward groups that a 
utilitarian planner is likely to wish to target—those with low permanent income, bad 
health, and costly informal care options. Moreover, the resulting redistribution to these 
targeted groups is greater than that which would be achieved by a cash-benefit program. 
In other words, providing transfers in kind as opposed to in cash appears to increase the 
extent of redistribution to targeted types. This occurs both because members of targeted 
groups are much more likely to be eligible for Medicaid than members of non-targeted 
groups and because, conditional on being eligible for Medicaid, members of targeted groups 
are much more likely to participate in Medicaid than members of non-targeted groups. 
4.2	 Targeting on the intensive margin: Evidence from the Cash 
and Counseling experiment 
We use the C&C data to assess whether in-kind provision provides any targeting benefits 
on the intensive margin, i.e. for those who do receive Medicaid home care assistance. The 
data contain measures of the recipients’ health, permanent income/ability, and price of 
informal care. We begin by comparing whether the targeted group used more Medicaid 
home care at baseline than the untargeted groups. At baseline, everyone received benefits 
in-kind. In this instance, correlations between care use and our measures of targetedness 
are preferable to treatment effects; so long as the unobservable, true measure that the 
program would like to target on is positively correlated with our measures, then the 
correlation allows our measure to stand in as a proxy for the underlying set of 
unobservables that would ideally be used for targeting–a treatment effect for our measure 
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would lose these correlations with the unobservable components. 
Table 6 presents the mean hours of Medicaid provided formal care used at baseline for the 
targeted and untargeted groups. Only those who were enrolled in Medicaid’s home care 
programs at baseline and those who did not purchase formal care in the private market are 
included. We excluded the latter group because we cannot separate Medicaid provided 
formal hours from those purchased in the private market. However, less than 10 percent of 
the sample is excluded for this reason and including them does not qualitatively change the 
results. 
Our first measure indicates whether or not the person lived alone. People who live alone 
are likely to face a higher price for informal care (because there is no one living with them 
who can help) and so would tend to be a targeted group. However, at baseline, those who 
lived alone actually received fewer hours of formal care from Medicaid than did those who 
did not live alone (the difference is statistically significant with p < 0.001). We might think 
that people who live alone are actually in better health than those who do not live alone. 
In that case, if Medicaid targets sicker people, the observed difference in means could be 
consistent with targeting benefits on the intensive margin. However, as seen in the next 
rows of Table 6, people who are in better health relative to others their age do not receive 
systematically lower hours of care than those in poorer health. This suggests that, on the 
intensive margin, the in-kind provision of care is having little targeting benefit on the 
health or informal care price dimensions. A third dimension of targeting we can explore 
with the C&C data is ability. Education levels are frequently used as a proxy for 
permanent income or ability. As seen in Table 6, there is not a strong relationship between 
education levels and the use of formal care at baseline. Thus, on the intensive margin, 
there is no evidence that Medicaid is targeting specific groups or that the provision of care 
in-kind is allocating greater benefits to targeted individuals. 
Now that we have examined both the intensive and extensive margins, we can perform a 
simple calculation to estimate the value of the targeting benefits. The targeting benefits of 
in-kind provision occur on the two dimensions discussed. On the extensive margin, in-kind 
provision reduces participation from 100 percent down to 54 percent of eligibles.18 On the 
intensive margin, the fraction of benefits that participants use falls from 100 percent with a 
cash transfer down to 91 percent with in-kind transfers.19 The additional cost of Medicaid 
home care due to the change on the extensive margin is just the full cost of providing home 
18In the HRS, we estimate who is eligible to participate in Medicaid based on income, assets, and ADL 
limitations. 
19The 90 percent figure is based on data from Arkansas’s C&C evaluation. At baseline, recipients had on 
average been receiving approximately 9.1 hours of formal care per week. Their care plans from Medicaid 
called for 10 hours of care per week on average. 
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care multiplied by the fraction increase in participation. This benefit is approximately $8.9 
billion in year 2000 dollars. On the intensive margin, an additional 9 percent of the costs of 
providing home care to all eligibles is an additional $2.5 billion in year 2000 dollars. The 
actual benefit from targeting is not the reduction in the size of the program, but the 
reduction in tax rates and thereby deadweight loss. If the cost to society of raising a dollar 
to pay for Medicaid home care is $0.15 of deadweight loss (Kleven and Kreiner, 2003), then 
the full targeting benefits are approximately $1.7 billion in year 2000 dollars. 
Of course, our estimate comes with many caveats. First, this calculation assumes that 
under the in-kind transfers regime, all targets receive the transfer. To the extent this is not 
true, our estimate overstates the targeting benefits of in-kind provision. Second, our 
estimate of who is eligible, and therefore of how large the change in participation will be, is 
inexact. If our measure counts people who are not eligible for Medicaid as eligible, then our 
participation estimate is too low, which causes our estimate of the increase in participation 
with a switch to cash transfers to be too large. This would again cause our estimated 
targeting benefits to be too large. 
4.2.1	 Testing necessary conditions for targeting benefits in the Cash and 
Counseling experiment 
Nichols and Zeckhauser (1982) discuss a variety of necessary conditions for restrictions 
imposed on benefits recipients to improve targeting efficiency. Three key conditions are: 
•	 Targeted groups have a greater demand for the good being provided in-kind than do 
other groups. 
•	 Goods provided in kind must be over-provided relative to what members of targeted 
groups would have chosen under a budget-equivalent cash transfer. 
•	 Goods provided in kind must not be of higher quality than members of targeted 
groups would buy under a budget-equivalent cash transfer program. 
In this section, we test whether these conditions are satisfied by Medicaid home care 
benefits. 
The first condition is that the targeted group has a greater demand for the good being 
provided in-kind than does the untargeted group. To test this condition, we compare the 
use of formal care at followup of targeted and untargeted individuals, but only among 
participants assigned to treatment. We focus on treated individuals because their use of 
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formal care is not constrained by Medicaid and therefore provides a clearer picture of their 
actual demand. Table 7 presents basic summary statistics on the average hours of formal 
care used in the previous two weeks by treatment group participants. Within each 
dimension of targeting available in the C&C, there is little evidence that the more targeted 
group has a higher demand for formal care. Neither living alone nor having poor health are 
strongly correlated with using more formal care. In fact, those with greater ability appear 
to have the highest demand for formal care, the opposite of the condition necessary for 
targeting benefits to have benefits.20 
A second necessary condition for in-kind provision of a good to have targeting benefits is 
that the good must be over-provided relative to what targets would have chosen under a 
budget-equivalent cash transfer. We test this condition in the C&C data by estimating 
whether being randomized to treatment reduced targeted participants’ hours of formal 
care. The results are presented in Table 8. Regardless of which dimension of targeting is 
considered, being assigned to the treatment group is associated with a large reduction in 
the hours of formal care used. This suggests that Medicaid does in fact over-provide formal 
care, even for targeted individuals. 
A third necessary condition for in-kind provision to have targeting benefits is that 
Medicaid not provide a higher quality bundle than a target would buy under a 
budget-equivalent cash transfer. At the followup survey, C&C participants were asked 
whether they were satisfied with the care they were receiving. Table 9 presents the fraction 
of participants that were satisfied with their care broken out by treatment status and level 
of targetedness. For many of the groups we think of as targeted, those who received 
treatment expressed a (statistically significant) higher level of satisfaction with their care 
than did those who did not receive treatment. This is consistent with Medicaid providing a 
relatively low-quality bundle of formal care which is in turn consistent with the necessary 
condition for in-kind provision to have targeting benefits. 
Overall, the in-kind provision of formal care passes two of the three tests that are necessary 
for targeting benefits to exist. Although the failure of the first test could be interpreted to 
reject the possibility that in-kind provision could even potentially have targeting benefits in 
this context, we would urge caution in taking this interpretation because our measures of 
who is a targeted individual may not correspond exactly to those that Medicaid is actually 
trying to target. 
20One interpretation of these data is that in order for those with more education to qualify for Medicaid, 
they must have received a much worse draw from the health distribution. However, that is not consistent 
with the participants’ views of their own health. 
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5 The Benefits of In-Kind Transfers: Samaritan’s
 
Dilemma and Tax System Efficiency 
Providing home-care benefits in kind has at least two other potential benefits relative to 
providing benefits in cash. First, it might alleviate the Samaritan’s dilemma (Bruce and 
Waldman, 1991). The Samaritan’s dilemma says that the possibility of receiving public 
welfare or private charity in the future may induce moral hazard in potential recipients 
thus making it more likely that they do indeed receive welfare or charity. This concern can 
potentially justify providing certain benefits in kind. Bruce and Waldman (1991), for 
example, argues that the Samaritan’s dilemma suggests that it may be optimal to provide 
job training rather than cash support since job training may reduce recipients’ future 
reliance on welfare or charity. Similarly, providing home care benefits in kind could 
alleviate the Samaritan’s dilemma. By providing home care benefits in kind, Medicaid 
likely reduces the prevalence of informal care among the low-income elderly. This informal 
care is often provided by the adult children of the elderly and often at the expense of 
engaging in market activity. Supplying informal care often reduces people’s market-related 
human capital (and so their future earnings) in addition to reducing their current earnings. 
Both of these effects may increase the likelihood that informal caregivers will later rely on 
Medicaid and other means-tested programs themselves, in their own old age. By providing 
home care benefits in kind and thereby reducing the demand for informal care, it is 
possible that Medicaid reduces the demand for future means-tested benefits. Hoynes et al. 
(2012) suggest that a similar intergenerational mechanism is relevant in the case of the 
food stamp program. 
Although we cannot directly assess the long-term impacts on informal caregivers with the 
C&C experiments, we can estimate whether switching to cash transfers increased the 
number of hours of care provided by informal caregivers. Table 10 presents the mean hours 
of informal care that C&C participants had in the two weeks prior to the followup survey. 
On average, members of the treatment group had 118 hours of informal care while 
members of the control group had 112. Even though we cannot reject that these two 
numbers are statistically distinguishable from each other, suppose that treatment did 
increase the use of informal care by six hours in a two-week period. The question then is 
whether three additional hours per week of informal care, a 4.9 percent increase, will 
significantly impact the probability that the informal caregiver takes up Medicaid home 
care (or other welfare programs) in the future. Offsetting the potential increase in hours of 
informal care is the payments that are are now received for a portion of those hours 
(treatment group members were able to pay their informal caregivers with the money from 
Medicaid). Foster et al. (2007) show that informal caregivers for people in the C&C 
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treatment group report less financial strain, were less likely to miss work, and were more 
able to look for other jobs than were informal caregivers for people in the control group 
(who received formal care in-kind). These findings suggest that even if there is a slight 
increase in informal caregiving when benefits are paid in-kind, it is unlikely that it causes 
increased reliance on welfare programs in the future. 
Providing home care benefits in-kind could also improve tax system efficiency. A 
well-known and fundamental principle of public finance is that taxing all goods at equal 
rates tends to minimize the excess burden from taxation. Yet as noted by (Munro, 1992) 
and recently emphasized by Mirrlees et al. (2010), when certain goods cannot be taxed or 
are not taxed (such as non-market time), then tax system efficiency can be enhanced by 
deviating from the uniform-taxation principle in certain specific ways. In particular, 
reducing tax rates on complements for market work effort and increasing tax rates on 
substitutes for market work effort can reduce the excess burden from taxation by reducing 
the distortion between market and non-market activity from the tax system. Mirrlees et al. 
(2010) argues that this consideration justifies reducing tax rates on market child care (a 
complement with market activity, especially among mothers of young children), despite the 
additional complexity this introduces into the tax system. The case of formal home care is 
very similar. In both cases, the tax system favors informal, household production of care 
over market care. And both market child care and market formal home care are 
complements for market activity. This suggests that there might be benefits of reducing 
tax rates on formal home care and other efforts to encourage formal care rather than 
informal care. By paying benefits in terms of in-kind formal home care, Medicaid tends to 
increase the use of formal care at the expense of informal care and thus may go some way 
toward increasing tax efficiency. 
Although the C&C experiments might appear to reduce tax system efficiency because they 
encourage additional hours of home care provided by informal caregivers, a fraction of 
those hours are now taxed as market work. Using the C&C data, Carlson et al. (2007) 
show that the treatment group members consumed the same or slightly more hours of paid 
care than control group members. Given that the use of formal care providers fell by more 
than 50 percent, this means that treatment group members chose to pay previously 
informal caregivers for the hours they no longer received from formal caregivers. Carlson 
et al. (2007) also show that the number of informal care hours that were provided without 
any direct cash payment was actually lower in the treatment group than in the control 
group. Providing transfers in cash reduced the amount of untaxed informal care provided 
and either did not affect or actually increased the hours of taxed care provided. Thus, 
counterintuitively, switching away from in-kind provision of home care to restricted cash 
payments, if anything, increased tax system efficiency. 
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6 Discussion of results and conclusion
 
In this paper, we estimate the costs and benefits of providing Medicaid home health care 
benefits in kind as opposed to in cash. We find that both the costs (in terms of distorting 
consumption) and the benefits (in terms of targeting intended beneficiaries) are significant. 
The finding of significant benefits means that, absent other means of targeting transfers to 
intended beneficiaries, providing benefits in kind has significant targeting benefits for the 
Medicaid program. The finding of significant costs, however, indicates that these targeting 
gains do not come cheaply and that the gains from finding alternative means of targeting 
benefits to intended beneficiaries would be significant. 
There are many difficulties involved in quantifying the costs and benefits of providing 
transfers in kind, and for this reason our paper should be viewed as a first step in this 
direction. The issue of optimal benefits design in government programs is a central one, as 
many of the most important government programs involve in-kind benefits, including 
public schooling, food stamps, public housing, and Medicare and Medicaid medical 
benefits. The costs and benefits of the design of these programs must be evaluated on a 
case-by-case basis, and our hope is that our approach in this paper will prove fruitful in the 
analysis of many of these other policies as well. 
Our results have implications for various reform proposals under consideration that seek to 
increase the control that beneficiaries have over the use of the benefits they receive from 
various programs. There have been a variety of proposals for Medicaid and other programs 
to increase the extent of “consumer-driven” care. Many of these proposals effectively bring 
the in-kind benefits programs closer to cash programs. The primary impetus for these 
proposals is the view that the consumption distortion from in-kind benefits is large, a view 
that is supported by our analysis of Medicaid home care benefits. Yet an overlooked cost of 
such reform proposals is that, in addition to reducing the consumption distortion cost of 
in-kind benefits, such proposals also likely reduce the targeting benefits of in-kind benefits. 
These reductions in targeting benefits must therefore be set against the reductions in 






¨ Baird, S., C. McIntosh, and B. Ozler (2011). Cash or condition? evidence from a cash 
transfer experiment. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 126 (4), 1709–1753. 
Blackorby, C. and D. Donaldson (1988). Cash versus kind, self-selection, and efficient 
transfers. The American Economic Review , 691–700. 
Bruce, N. and M. Waldman (1991). Transfers in kind: Why they can be efficient and 
nonpaternalistic. The American Economic Review 81 (5), 1345–1351. 
Carlson, B. L., L. Foster, S. B. Dale, and R. Brown (2007). Effects of cash and counseling 
on personal care and well-being. Health Services Research 42 (1), 467–487. 
Cunha, J. M. (2013). Testing paternalism: Cash vs. in-kind transfers. American Economic 
Journal: Applied Economics forthcoming. 
Currie, J. and F. Gahvari (2008, June). Transfers in cash and in-kind: Theory meets the 
data. Journal of Economic Literature 46 (2), 333–383. 
Finkelstein, A., E. F. Luttmer, and M. J. Notowidigdo (2013). What good is wealth 
without health? the effect of health on the marginal utility of consumption. Journal of 
the European Economic Association 11 (s1), 221–258. 
Foster, L., S. B. Dale, and R. Brown (2007). How caregivers and workers fared in cash and 
counseling. Health services research 42 (1p2), 510–532. 
Ganong, P. and J. B. Liebman (2013). The decline, rebound, and further rise in snap 
enrollment: Disentangling business cycle fluctuations and policy changes. Technical 
report, National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Hidrobo, M., J. Hoddinott, A. Margolies, V. Moreira, and A. Peterman (2012). Impact 
evaluation of cash, food vouchers, and food transfers among colombian refugees and poor 
ecuadorians in carchi and sucumb́ıos. Washington, DC: International Food Policy 
Research Institute. 
Hoynes, H. W., D. W. Schanzenbach, and D. Almond (2012). Long run impacts of 
childhood access to the safety net. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic 
Research. 
Hoynes, H. W. and D. Whitmore Schanzenbach (2009). Consumption responses to in-kind 
transfers: Evidence from the introduction of the food stamp program. American 
Economic Journal: Applied Economics , 109–139. 
23
 
Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured (2011). Medicaid home and 
community-based service programs: Data update. Technical report, Henry J. Kaiser 
Family Foundation. 
Kleven, H. and C. Kreiner (2003). The marginal cost of public funds in oecd countries; 
hours of work versus labor force participation. 
LeBlanc, A. J., C. Tonner, and C. Harrington (2001). State medicaid programs offering 
personal care services. Health Care Financing Review 22 (4), 155–174. 
Meer, J. and J. West (2012, June). Effects of the minimum wage on employment dynamics. 
SSRN , 1–28. 
Mirrlees, J. A. et al. (2010). Dimensions of tax design: the Mirrlees review. Oxford 
University Press. 
Moffitt, R. (1989). Estimating the value of an in-kind transfer: The case of food stamps. 
Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society , 385–409. 
Munro, A. (1992). Self-selection and optimal in-kind transfers. The Economic 
Journal 102 (414), 1184–1196. 
Nichols, A. L. and R. J. Zeckhauser (1982). Targeting transfers through restrictions on 
recipients. The American Economic Review 72 (2), 372–377. 
Viscusi, W. K. and W. N. Evans (1990). Utility functions that depend on health status: 
estimates and economic implications. The American Economic Review , 353–374. 
Whitmore Schanzenbach, D. (2002). What are food stamps worth? Princeton University 










Figure 1: Consumption Distortion from In-Kind Provision
 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2: How Cash Benefits Affect the Use of Agency Care
 
kansas Florida New Jersey
Treatment group 13.90 12.38 16.09 14.32
(0.65) (0.96) (1.40) (1.15)
Control group 29.29 21.43 39.24 32.79
(1.15) (1.39) (3.41) (1.39)
Implied percent effect -52.54** -42.23** -59.01** -56.34**
(2.91) (5.85) (5.03) (3.97)
Price change due to treatment 12.71 10.90 12.65 14.60
Observations 2,783 1,237 688 858
Separately by state
The mean of formal care hours by treatment status are presented in the first two 
rows (standard errors in parentheses). The implied percentage impact of being in the 
treatment group reported in third row. Baseline column includes observations from all 
three states that conducted experiments. Price change due to treatment gives the 
estimated price increase for formal care that corresponds to being treated. 
Observations gives the total (treatment plus control) number of observations for the 





Minimum wage 0.406** 0.357** 0.354**
(0.073) (0.084) (0.071)





State f.e. x x x
Year f.e. x x x
Demographics x x
Mean of dependent variable 8.928 8.928 8.928
F-stat 30.51 18.07 24.93
R-squared 0.941 0.948 0.948
N 656 656 656
Dependent variable is average wages for home health care aides. Data for 
1999-2011. Minimum wage is the minimum wage in effect in a given state 
and year. Demographics include fraction of population of given gender, 















Minimum wage -0.838 -1.076* -1.118*
(0.481) (0.499) (0.507)





State f.e. x x x
Year f.e. x x x
Demographics x x
Mean of dependent variable 12.819 12.819 12.819
R-squared 0.489 0.532 0.536
N 1020 1020 1020
Dependent variable is home health care aides per 1000 60+ year olds. 
Data from 1989-2007. Minimum wage is the minimum wage in effect in a 
given state in year t-1. Demographics include fraction of population of 
given gender, age, and race. * p<.05, ** p<.01.





Lived alone 0.45 888





Very Good 0.25 350
Excellent 0.24 87
Education:
Less than high school 0.45 1,212
GED 0.31 147
High School 0.29 611
Some college 0.26 299
College or more 0.23 109
Fraction of eligibles who have Medicaid and number of 
observations in HRS data. Within each dimension of targeting, 
rows progress from more targeted to less targeted.





Table 6: Targeting Benefits in C&C, Intensive Margin
 
12.19
Average hours of 
formal care Observations
Lived alone 12.19 781







Less than high school 13.71 1,301
High school 12.32 739
College or more 15.35 211
Means and number of observations presented for the number of 
formal hours in the previous week at baseline. Within each 
dimension of targeting, rows progress from more targeted to less 
targeted. Statistics presented only for those enrolled in Medicaid 





Table 7: Demand for Formal Care by Dimensions of Targeting
 
460
Average hours of 
formal care Observations
Lived alone 13.95 460







Less than high school 13.30 823
High school 14.77 439
College or more 16.73 117
Means and number of observations presented for the number 
of formal hours among treatment group at followup. Within 








Lived alone 13.95 21.70 0.000
Did not live alone 13.89 33.29 0.000
Health:
Poor 13.57 29.19 0.000
Fair 14.31 29.27 0.000
Good 13.78 29.75 0.000
Excellent 12.22 31.35 0.012
Education:
Less than high school 13.30 26.24 0.000
High school 14.77 32.65 0.000
College or more 16.73 36.37 0.000
Means of hours of formal care in two weeks preceding followup survey 
presented by targeting dimension and treatment status. P-value for difference 
within targeting dimension, across treatment status presented in last column.








Lived alone 0.89 0.79 0.000
Did not live alone 0.92 0.89 0.018
Health:
Poor 0.90 0.82 0.000
Fair 0.91 0.86 0.037
Good 0.94 0.90 0.139
Excellent 0.91 0.91 0.907
Education:
Less than high school 0.91 0.86 0.002
High school 0.92 0.85 0.006
College or more 0.88 0.82 0.259
Fraction of participants who responded that they were satisfied with 
their care in followup survey presented by targeting dimension and 
treatment status. P-value for difference within targeting dimension, 
across treatment status presented in last column.




Table 10: How Cash Benefits Affect the Use of Informal Care
 
Baseline Arkansas Florida New Jersey
Treatment group 117.91 114.23 125.29 117.25
(3.15) (4.64) (6.48) (5.72)
Control group 112.40 110.20 122.54 107.44
(3.37) (4.94) (7.01) (6.10)
Implied percent effect 4.90 3.66 2.24 9.13
(4.22) (6.27) (7.89) (8.17)
Observations 2,783 1,237 688 858
Separately by state
The mean of informal care hours by treatment status are presented in the first two 
rows (standard errors in parentheses). The implied percentage impact of being in the 
treatment group reported in third row. Baseline column includes observations from all 
three states that conducted experiments. Observations gives the total (treatment plus 
control) number of observations for the column. * p <.05, ** p<.01
36
 
A The targeting benefit of in-kind transfers
 
This section presents a simple model that establishes two key results about the targeting 
effects of providing benefits in-kind relative to in cash. The first is that, other things equal, 
a means-tested cash-benefit program targets individuals with better health and with less 
costly informal care options—the opposite of the targeting that would be desired by a 
utilitarian planner. The second is that, other things equal, a means-tested in-kind benefit 
program that provides in-kind formal care (a substitute for informal care) targets 
individuals with worse health and with more costly informal care options, as desired by a 
utilitarian planner. 
There are two periods. The individual has preferences over consumption in each period: 
U = u(c1) + u(c2). 
The rates of time preference and of interest are both zero. In the first period, the individual 
chooses how much to consume and save out of his (exogenous) after-tax resources: 
c1 + s1 = (1 − τ)α, 
where α is the individual’s labor productivity, s1 is first period savings, and τ is a labor 
tax. In the second period, the individual requires a fixed amount of care, η, which is known 
when the individual chooses how much to consume in the first period. The individual can 
meet this need by any combination of formal and informal care, which are perfect 
substitutes. The price of formal care is p. The (opportunity) cost of informal care is σ. In 
the second period, the individual consumes whatever resources are left over after receiving 
net government transfers, which may include both cash and in-kind formal care 
components, (tc, tf ), and paying for the (exogenous) level of care he requires, η. The 
second-period budget constraint depends on the exact nature of the government transfer 
programs, which are considered in turn now. 
A.1 No benefit program, (tc, tf ) = (0, 0) 
Absent any government transfers in period two, the individual chooses whichever type of 
care is cheapest, i.e., he chooses formal care if and only if p ≤ σ. The second-period budget 
constraint in this case is 




α − σ̃η 
U(α, σ, η; P = 0) = 2u , (3)
2
using σ̃ ≡ min{σ, p}. The individual optimally splits his resources equally between the first 
and second periods, so utility is 
where P = 0 indicates that the individual does not participate in any government benefit 
program. 
Next, we consider two types of schemes available to the planner given the information 
constraints she faces: a means-tested cash benefit program (similar to, for example, the US 
SSI program) and a means-tested in-kind benefit that provides formal home care, based on 
the US Medicaid program. 
A.2 Means-tested cash benefit program 
This program makes a cash transfer to the individual, the size of which is decreasing in the 
individual’s savings: tc(s1) with t�c(s1) < 0.
21 Under this program, the individual’s 
second-period budget constraint is 
c2 = s1 + tc ση. (s1) − ˜
The simplest version of such a program sets a floor on net-of-transfer savings and implicitly 
taxes away any savings beyond that point among people who participate in the program: 
tc(s1) = max{0, t̄c − s1}. 
Under this version of the program, the individual’s second-period budget constraint is 
c2 = max{t̄c, s1} − σ̃η. 
Conditional on participating in the program, the individual should not save any resources 
into period two, since any savings simply serves to reduce transfers one-for-one and so does 
not increase second-period consumption. Thus, conditional on participating in the 
∗ ∗ tc − ˜program, c1(α, σ, η) = α and c2(α, σ, η) = ¯ ση. The individual’s indirect utility 
21One could consider a related cash-transfer scheme whose means test is based on the individual’s net 
assets after paying for any (formal) care rather than on the individual’s gross assets before paying for care 
(as in the scheme under consideration). In fact, however, a scheme based on net assets after care expenses 




P ≡ U(α, σ, η; P = 1) − U(α, σ, η; P = 0) > 0 
α − ˜⇐⇒ u(α) + u( ¯ ση) > 2u ση B − ˜ (4)
2 
conditional on participating is
 
U(α, σ, η; P = 1) ≡ u(α) + u(B̄ − σ̃η) 
The individual participates in the program if and only if 
The benefit of participating in the program is greater total lifetime consumption (by t̄c) 
from receiving the cash transfer. The cost of participating in the program is that the 
individual potentially (depending on his type) has to distort his consumption—consuming 
more in period one than in period two—in order to qualify. 
The following types of people are more likely to participate in this program:22 
• Lower labor productivity α (good targeting) 
It’s more costly for high-labor productivity people to meet the means test, since they 
would otherwise wish to save more than lower-labor productivity people given their 
greater demand for c2. 
• Lower care costs σ and lower care needs η (bad targeting) 
It’s more costly for high-care cost individuals to meet the means test (i.e., they would 
have to distort their consumption more), since they would otherwise wish to save 
more than people with lower care costs given their greater expenses in period two. 
Like the first best, the means-tested cash benefit program redistributes toward those with 
lower labor productivity. Unlike the first best, however, this program redistributes away 
from those with higher care costs, which increases the risk to living standards from these 
costs. This occurs because the means test imposes greater costs on people with higher care 
costs, since in the absence of the program they would like to save more than otherwise 
similar people with lower care costs. This major limitation of means-tested cash benefit 
programs motivates the search for better alternatives. The commonly observed solution to 
this problem is a means-tested in-kind program, to which we now turn. 
22Note also that people with a greater willingness to substitute consumption over time are also more likely 
to participate in the program, since it is not as costly for them to have a non-smooth consumption profile. 
This is an example of “bad targeting”: having a high elasticity of intertemporal substitution, ceteris paribus, 
is not an indicator of having a high (lifetime) marginal utility of wealth. The first-best insurance program 





, if α ≤ 2w̄;
U(α, σ, η; P = 1) = 
u(α − w̄) + u(w̄), if α ≥ 2w̄. 
� 
A.3 Medicaid-type means-tested in-kind benefit program 
As just seen, a major disadvantage of means-tested cash benefit programs is that they 
exacerbate the consumption risk arising from care cost risk. This raises the question of 
whether alternative program designs could increase insurance against care cost risk. One 
idea that may have potential in this regard is a means-tested in-kind program. One 
difficulty of paying cash benefits is that cash is as attractive to “mimics” as it is to 
intended beneficiaries, so cash benefits do not lead to any systematic self-selection into 
program participation of different types. Paying benefits in kind, on the other hand, has 
the potential to improve on this situation. Including in the benefits bundle goods (or even 
bads) that are valued more highly by intended beneficiaries than by potential mimics can 
create favorable self-selection into the program, i.e., selection that furthers the planner’s 
goal of redistributing to intended beneficiaries. 
Consider a Medicaid-type program, which is means tested and provides benefits in kind, in 
the form of formal home health care. Specifically, suppose that Medicaid provides 
qualifying individuals up to µ units of formal care. In addition to paying benefits in kind, 
this program differs in one other important way from the cash-benefit program considered 
above: it tests means net of (after) spending on formal care, as opposed to gross of 
(before) spending on any care. Specifically, suppose that in order to qualify for Medicaid, 
someone’s wealth net of spending on formal care must not exceed w̄. 
If Medicaid benefits are sufficient to cover the individual’s care needs entirely, µ ≥ η, 23 
then second-period consumption conditional on participating in Medicaid is: 
c2 = min{ ̄w, s1}. 
The incentives for saving facing individuals in this case are slightly different from those in 
the cash-benefit case. Now, saving up to w̄ is not implicitly taxed by the means test; 
individuals keep any savings they have up to w̄ for themselves. Saving beyond w̄ is taxed 
away completely by the means test. Utility conditional on participating is therefore   
23We focus on this case since it is much simpler than the case in which Medicaid benefits are not sufficient 




�     
ΔUP ≡ U(α, σ, η; P = 1) − U(α, σ, η; P = 0) > 0 
2u α 
2 , if α ≤ 2w̄; α − σ̃η ⇐⇒ U(α, σ, η; P = 1) = > 2u (5)
2u(α − w̄) + u(w̄), if α ≥ 2w̄. 
The individual participates in the program if and only if 
The following types of people are more likely to participate in this program: 
• Lower labor productivity α (good targeting) 
It’s more costly for high-labor productivity people to meet the means test. 
• Higher care costs σ and higher care needs η (good targeting) 
The value of the Medicaid transfer is increasing in one’s care costs, since 
participating in Medicaid eliminates the need to finance one’s own care. 
This program, unlike the cash-benefit program, transfers more resources to people with 
higher care costs and thus provides more insurance against this risk. This is the targeting 
benefit of paying benefits in kind. The improvement in targeting, however, does not come 
without a cost. The cost is that some people distort their care choices in order to increase 
the amount of benefits for which they qualify. This arises for two reasons. First, it arises 
because Medicaid provides benefits in the form of formal care. For people whose costs of 
informal care are lower than the cost of formal care, this is a social waste; society would be 
richer if these people received informal rather than formal care, but the incentives built 
into the in-kind benefits program lead them to consume more costly formal care instead. 
This is the consumption distortion that most people think of. The second reason Medicaid 
leads people to distort their care consumption is that its means test is based on net wealth 
after paying for formal care. This latter effect does not arise in the preceding analysis since 
it considers only individuals whose care needs are met completely by Medicaid’s maximum 
benefit, µ. For individuals who require more care than µ, Medicaid’s means testing rules 
provide an incentive to spend some of their own assets on formal care in order to qualify 
for Medicaid coverage (also of formal care) even if their costs of informal care are lower 
than the cost of formal care. In sum, by paying benefits in-kind, this program is better able 
to insure people against the risk of having high care costs but at the cost of encouraging 
people to consume too much formal care rather than informal care. 
The cash and in-kind schemes also potentially differ in terms of the extent to which they 
distort the timing of consumption (and, more generally, any earlier decisions that affect 
future benefit receipt, such as labor supply). But, aside from being very difficult to 
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measure empirically, this distortion is common to all means-tested programs; it is not 
special to the issue of interest in this paper of whether to pay benefits in kind or in cash. 
42
 
